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ALIENS' FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AGAINST GOV-
ERNMENT SEARCHES ABROAD-United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741
(1989).
Abstract: The "war on drugs" and the effort to contain international terrorism have
raised questions of when the Constitution restricts the actions of the United States govern-
ment abroad. This Note analyzes United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a case in which the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that aliens have fourth amendment rights against
United States government searches of their residences abroad. The Note agrees that the
court's holding was correct, but suggests the court's "natural rights" theory was too broad
to comport with prior Supreme Court limitations of aliens' constitutional rights. Instead,
the Note suggests that the relationship between an alien and the United States must be
examined before constitutional rights are extended to aliens. The Note concludes that the
relationship between alien criminal defendants and the United States government justifies
the extension of fourth amendment rights.
The United States Constitution protects citizens when the govern-
ment acts outside the United States.1 It is unclear, however, whether
the Constitution protects an alien in similar circumstances.2 This
issue was considered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.3 In Verdugo-Urquidez, a divided panel
held that the fourth amendment' protected a Mexican citizen, Rene
Verdugo-Urquidez, against a search of his Mexican residence by
United States drug enforcement agents. 5 The extension of fourth
amendment rights in such a situation is unprecedented.6
The majority in Verdugo-Urquidez based its holding on the theory
that some rights are "natural" and possessed by all people.7 However,
the dissent argued that only people who have made a compact with the
government are entitled to the protections of the Constitution.8 Close
I. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 721 comment b (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Unless otherwise indicated, "Constitution" means "United States Constitution, .... citizen(s)"
means "citizen(s) of the United States," "government" means "Unitdd States government," and
"the United States" refers to the fifty states and all United States territories.
2. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 722 comment m.
3. 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989).
4. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. erdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1224.
6. Id. at 1230 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 1219-20.
8. Id. at 1231-37.
Washington Law Review
analysis of Verdugo-Urquidez shows that the majority's use of natural
rights theory allowed it to reach the correct result, but their analysis
does not comport with the Supreme Court's requirement that suffi-
cient ties exist between Verdugo-Urquidez and the government. Scru-
tiny of those ties reveals that, even applying the dissent's compact
theory analysis, the majority's result can be reached. This Note con-
cludes, however, that broader scrutiny of the relationship between
Verdugo-Urquidez and the government is preferable, and necessary to
make extension of such rights meaningful.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1986, at the request of United States officials and pursuant to a
valid United States arrest warrant, Mexican authorities arrested
accused drug smuggler, kidnapper, and murderer, Rene Martin
Verdugo-Urquidez. 9 The United States Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA") subsequently received custody of Verdugo-Urquidez in the
United States. After receiving custody of Verdugo-Urquidez in the
United States, the DEA obtained permission from the Mexican gov-
ernment to search Verdugo-Urquidez's two Mexican residences. The
DEA did not seek approval or a warrant for the search from either the
United States Justice Department, a United States Attorney's office, or
a United States magistrate.' 0 DEA agents, with the help of several
Mexican Federal Judicial Police officers, searched Verdugo-Urquidez's
Mexican residences.' 1
At a subsequent hearing, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to
suppress the evidence seized from his Mexican residence. The court
held that the search violated the fourth amendment because the DEA
failed to seek a search warrant and because the DEA's search was
unreasonable.'" On appeal by the United States government, a divided
three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
district court's ruling.' 3
9. Id. at 1215-17.
10. Id. at 1216 n.2.
11. The search disclosed a tally sheet that purportedly reflected the quantities of marijuana
smuggled into the United States by Verdugo-Urquidez. Id. at 1217.
12. The DEA's conduct was unreasonable because the search was unconstitutionally general,
it occurred after midnight, and the DEA failed to leave a contemporaneous inventory of the
evidence seized. Id.
13. Id. at 1230.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: HOW CITIZENSHIP AND THE
LOCATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTION
AFFECT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The two most important factors in Verdugo-Urquidez are the citi-
zenship of the defendant and the fact that the government search
occurred on foreign soil. This Note first considers Supreme Court
decisions involving the rights of aliens within the United States, and
then examines the rights of citizens and aliens against government acts
abroad.
A. Constitutional Protections of Aliens Against Government Actions
in the United States
Aliens within the United States enjoy substantial constitutional
rights. As early as 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,14 the Supreme Court
noted that the portions of the fourteenth amendment referring to "per-
sons" were "universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction" of the United States. i" Similarly, in Wong
Wing v. United States, the Court held that deportable aliens are pro-
tected by the sixth amendment protections reserved to all "accused." 16
More recently, however, in Mathews v. Diaz, 7 the Court accepted the
reasoning of Yick Wo and Wong Wing, but suggested that aliens are
not entitled to all of the protections and provisions of the Constitu-
tion."8 Further, the Court stated that all aliens need not be treated
alike under all circumstances.9 The Court listed examples of consti-
tutional and statutory provisions that apply expressly to citizens,2° and
distinctions that the law has drawn among aliens.21
The Court has never stated that the constitutional provisions
reserved to "the people"22 in the Constitution protect only citizens.
The distinction was not made in Mathews, even though that case
14. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
15. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
16. 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1895).
17. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
18. Id. at 78-79.
19. Id. The Court said:
The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause
does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages
of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single
homogeneous legal classification.
Id. at 78.
20. Id. at 78 n.12.
21. Id. at 79 n.13.
22. See U.S. CONsT. amends. I, II, IV, IX, X.
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discussed the distinction between the constitutional rights of aliens
and citizens.23 Recently, in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Lopez-Mendoza,2 4 the Court indicated that the fourth amendment
rights reserved to "the people" are possessed by undocumented aliens
within the United States.2
While the cases discussed above show that aliens within the United
States have substantial constitutional rights, they shed little light on
whether those protections follow aliens abroad. Court decisions
involving the exclusion of aliens from the United States have implied
that aliens have no constitutional rights until they enter the country.26
However, these cases are premised on the view that Congress possesses
a plenary power inherent in any sovereign to decide who can pass
through its borders. 27 That power may not apply outside of the immi-
gration setting.28 More recent Court language indicates that aliens
seeking admission lack constitutional rights only in regard to their
admission.29
B. The Scope of Constitutional Protections when the United States
Acts Abroad
1. The Constitutional Protections of Citizens Against United States
Government Actions Abroad
At one time the Constitution did not protect either citizens or aliens
outside the territory of the United States. 30 For example, in 1891 the
23. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
24. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
25. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984)
(plurality opinion) (holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in a
deportation proceeding); see also id. at 1051 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1032, 1055 (White,
J., joined in pertinent part by Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1060 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161
(1945) (Murphy, J., concurring); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893)
(Brewer, J., dissenting).
27. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
28. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (nonresident alien
corporation entitled to fifth amendment protections against government confiscation of its
property in the United States); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (implying that
the fifth amendment protects alien corporations' property abroad, except in times of war).
29. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("[A]n alien seeking initial admission to the
United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for
the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative."); see also Jean v. Nelson, 472
U.S. 846, 868-77 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. See Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad
and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 19-21 (1985).
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Supreme Court held that an American seaman, accused of murder in
Japanese waters and being tried by the American consul in Japan, was
not entitled to the jury trial guaranteed by the Constitution.31 The
Court stated that "[t]he Constitution can have no operation in another
country."
32
In 1957, the Court abandoned Ross' strict territorial limit to the
Constitution's scope.33 Reid v. Covert34 involved court martial pro-
ceedings against a United States citizen accused of killing her husband
while residing on a United States armed forces base in England. 35 The
Court held that the defendant could not be tried by military authori-
ties because a military trial denied her the protections of article III and
the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution.36
Justice Black's plurality opinion in Reid rejected the Court's previ-
ous rule that the Constitution has no effect in a foreign country.37
However, two concurring opinions limited the extension of rights to
the circumstances in the case-citizens accused of capital crimes dur-
ing peacetime.38 Even so, Reid is regarded as sound precedent for the
proposition that the Constitution protects citizens against government
actions abroad.39
2. Constitutional Protections of Aliens Against United States
Government Actions Abroad
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,4 the Supreme
Court stated in dicta that "[n]either the Constitution nor the laws
passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in
respect of our own citizens."41 However, the issue in Curtiss-Wright
31. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
32. Id. In a series of cases following Ross, the Court 'concluded that inhabitants of lands
possessed by the United States were protected by the Constitution only if Congress had decided
to "incorporate" the territory into the United States, rather than govern it as a territory outside
the Union. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
33. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 18-19.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id. at 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 75-76 (Harlan, J., concurring). While the
concurring justices did not rule out the possibility that constitutional rights might apply in other
circumstances abroad, both reserved judgment on what circumstances warranted the extension of
such rights.
39. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 721 comment b & Reporters' notes 1-2.
40. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
41. Id. at 318; see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (executive agreement
regarding recognition of a foreign country takes precedence over conflicting state policy). In
Washington Law Review
was not whether the Constitution protected aliens abroad, but the
breadth of powers Congress may delegate to the Executive Branch
regarding foreign affairs.42 The case has not been considered authority
for denying constitutional protections to aliens abroad.43
Subsequent to Curtiss- Wright, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, " the Court
held that nonresident enemy aliens who had served a government at
war with the United States did not have a constitutional right to a jury
trial.4 The defendants in Eisentrager were World War II war
criminals, imprisoned in Germany, seeking writs of habeas corpus in
United States courts after being convicted by a military tribunal.46
In Eisentrager, the defendants' status as enemy aliens was a key fac-
tor in the Court's decision to deny constitutional protections to
them.4" The Court stated that nonhostile aliens are accorded a "gen-
erous and ascending scale of rights" as their identity with United
States society increases.48 However, the opinion contained dicta that
undermine the argument for constitutional protections of nonenemy
aliens in foreign lands. The Court rejected the argument that protec-
tions of the Constitution extend to all persons in all circumstances,
49
and indicated that the Constitution only protects aliens who are physi-
cally present within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.5
Justice Black dissented in Eisentrager, arguing that some constitu-
tional protections were "not for citizens alone, but for all persons com-
ing within the ambit of our power."'" Justice Black acknowledged
that there may be some limit to the extension of these rights, especially
Belmont, the Court referred to Curtiss-Wright and stated, once again in dicta: "[O]ur
Constitution, laws, and policies have no extraterritorial operation, unless in respect of our own
citizens." Belmont, 301 U.S. at 332. However, the Court was merely pointing out that the
Constitution does not govern the acts of other countries.
42. Although Justice Sutherland's dicta in Curtiss-Wright implied that the source of the
foreign affairs powers of the President and Congress are extra-constitutional, this view has been
criticized. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 361 (2d. ed 1988).
Moreover, Sutherland's opinion also stated that such powers, "like every other governmental
power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution."
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320; see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
252-53 (1972).
43. See RESTATEMENT, supra note I, § 722 comment m & Reporters' note 16.
44. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
45. Id. at 785.
46. Id. at 765-66.
47. Id. at 771.
48. Id. at 770. In contrast, citizens in post-war situations may not be subjected to military
justice except in areas where armed hostilities have made enforcement of civil law impossible. See
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
49. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 782-85.
50. Id. at 771 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
51. Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting).
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to alien enemies,52 but he argued that the Constitution is not "wholly
inapplicable in foreign territory that we occupy and govern." 3 Seven
years later, in Reid, Black convinced a majority of the Court to extend
extraterritorial constitutional protections to citizens." However,
because the statements in Reid, Curtiss-Wright, and Eisentrager con-
cerning nonenemy aliens' rights were dicta, the scope of aliens' consti-
tutional rights abroad is still uncertain.
C. Subsequent Developments in the Lower Courts
Even though the Supreme Court has not clearly determined the
constitutional rights of aliens outside the United States, many federal
courts have extended such rights to aliens against government actions
outside the United States." The most relevant of these cases to
Verdugo-Urquidez is United States v. Toscanino.56 In Toscanino, a
three-judge panel held that an alien defendant's fourth amendment
rights were violated when the government facilitated his seizure and
torture in South America and brought him to the United States for
trial.5 7  Toscanino broadly implied that aliens are protected by the
fourth amendment whenever the federal government acts abroad in
connection with a criminal proceeding. 8
52. Id. at 796.
53. Id. at 796-97.
54. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
55. See, eg., Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 915-17 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dicta that the
universe of nonresident aliens who can invoke the Constitution is not limited to situations in
which the res is subject to the court's jurisdiction); United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862,
866-69 (3d Cir. 1980) (court assumed that fourth amendment protected both citizens and aliens
aboard a vessel on high seas, but search was not in violation of the fourth amendment), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1979) (once
aliens become subject to liability under United States law, they have right to benefit from
protection of fourth amendment, but search of foreign vessel on high seas by United States Coast
Guard complied with fourth amendment restrictions); United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 260
(U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (alien civilians charged with nonmilitary offenses must be provided with
same constitutional safeguards in United States court in Berlin that are provided to civilian
defendants in any other United States court).
56. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 275.
58. Id. at 280. In a discussion of protections against searches and seizures on foreign soil, the
court stated: "No sound basis is offered in support of a different rule with respect to aliens who
are the victims of unconstitutional action abroad, at least where the government seeks to exploit




III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
IN VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Ninth Circuit answered affirmatively the
threshold question of whether the fourth amendment protects aliens,
in custody in the United States, against government searches of their
residences outside the United States.59 The following part of this Note
will discuss the rationale of the majority and dissenting opinions
regarding the existence of Verdugo-Urquidez's fourth amendment
rights.
A. The Majority Opinion
Judge Thompson's majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez relied on
the extraterritorial constitutional protections granted to citizens in
Reid to conclude that the Constitution imposes substantive constraints
upon the federal government when it acts abroad.6" From that propo-
sition, the court concluded that nonresident aliens can challenge the
government's action abroad by invoking the fourth amendment.61
The majority rejected the use of compact theory, relied upon by the
dissent, to determine extraterritorial constitutional rights of aliens.62
Compact theory suggests that the protections and privileges of the
Constitution are reserved for those persons who make a social com-
pact with the government.63 The majority acknowledged that com-
pact theory has been used by the Supreme Court to explain aspects of
federalism, but not to define the extraterritorial reach of the Constitu-
tion.64 According to the majority, compact theory would deny aliens
constitutional rights against government actions abroad because that
theory excludes them from "the people" to whom the promise of the
Constitution runs.65
59. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989). After answering that question, the court explored what actions are
sufficient to qualify as government acts abroad and what the fourth amendment requires in such
instances. Id. at 1224-30. These latter issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
60. Id. at 1218.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1219.
63. Id. at 1218-21. The persons who are party to this compact sacrifice some of their natural
rights in order to create a central government capable of preserving the rest of those rights.
Compact theory explains the Constitution as a compact between "the people" mentioned in the
preamble to the Constitution and the federal government. Only "the people" receive the
protections of the Constitution. See 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 306-72 (1970) (reprint of 1st ed. 1833); Stephan, Constitutional Limits
on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 783-85 (1980).
64. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1220.
65. Id. at 1218-19.
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The majority argued that, while compact theory can explain the
constitutional rights of citizens, legal resident aliens, and aliens seek-
ing admission to the United States, it fails to explain Supreme Court
cases which have extended constitutional protections to undocu-
mented aliens in the United States.66 The court turned instead to nat-
ural rights theory to explain aliens' rights .6  The majority argued that
natural rights are possessed by all persons, are inalienable, and cannot
be encroached upon arbitrarily by government. 68  Because the
Supreme Court has indicated that undocumented aliens who are vol-
untarily in the United States have fourth amendment rights,6 9 the
majority reasoned that an alien who is in the United States involunta-
rily, such as Verdugo-Urquidez, also possesses such rights.7"
B. The Dissent
Judge Wallace, in dissent, criticized the majority's reasoning and
holding.71 He argued that the majority opinion relied on a line of
cases establishing citizens' constitutional rights abroad, and another
line of cases establishing constitutional protections for aliens against
government actions in the United States, to conclude, improperly, that
an alien has constitutional protections against government actions
abroad.72 The dissent noted that the majority failed to cite any
Supreme Court case that suggests the Constitution limits government
action against aliens in territory under foreign dominion.7"
The dissent asserted that the majority ignored the Supreme Court
language in Curtiss- Wright that limits the extraterritorial protections
of the Constitution to citizens.74 It further argued that the Supreme
Court has supported the concept of the Constitution as compact
between the people of the United States and the government.75 The
dissent maintained that the compact requires those people to sacrifice
a modicum of their "natural rights" in order to create a central
66. Id. at 1222.
67. Id. at 1219-20. For a discussion of natural rights theory, see Note, The Extraterritorial
Application of the Constitution-Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REv. 649, 650-53 (1986). See
generally B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY (1971).
68. Verdugo-Urquidez 856 F.2d at 1219-20.
69. Id. at 1223 (discussing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 (1984)).
70. Id. at 1224.
71. Id. at 1230 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1230-31.
73. Id. at 1235.
74. Id; see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.




government capable of preserving their remaining rights.7 6 In the dis-
sent's view, the individuals who are party to that compact differ
depending on the rights in question. Supreme Court precedent makes
it clear that all individuals within the United States receive the protec-
tions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments reserved to "persons. 77
However, the dissent argued that the class of "the people" mentioned
in the fourth amendment is more limited.78 The dissent asserted that a
government search or seizure abroad is only restricted by the fourth
amendment when the target of the search or seizure is a United States
citizen or, possibly, an alien with extensive ties correlating to alle-
giance to the United States.79
IV. ANALYSIS OF VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ
Careful analysis suggests that, while the majority's result in
Verdugo- Urquidez was correct, its use of natural rights theory does not
comport with limits placed on constitutional rights by the Supreme
Court. However, neither can the dissent's use of compact theory be
persuasively harmonized with Supreme Court cases. Determining
aliens' constitutional rights requires a broader examination of the ties
between the aliens and the government.
A. Natural Rights Theoy Does Not Explain Supreme Court
Decisions Regarding Constitutional Rights of Aliens
The majority's natural rights theory ignores indications from the
Supreme Court that aliens must have some type of significant tie to
this country to possess constitutional rights. Fifth and fourteenth
amendment rights are reserved to "persons" and have been interpreted
as applying to all aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States.8"
However, in Landon v. Plasencia,8 t the Court endorsed the view that
aliens seeking initial admission have no due process rights regarding
their applications.8" Similarly, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 83 the Court
explained that an alien is "accorded a generous and ascending scale of
rights as he increases his identity with our society,"84 but that enemy
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
78. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1239 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1234-36.
80. Mathews v. Diaz. 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
81. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
82. Id. at 32.
83. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
84. Id. at 770.
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aliens outside the United States could possess no constitutional rights
to a jury trial."
These exceptions demonstrate that constitutional protections are
not inalienable and natural. Their existence depends upon an individ-
ual's relationship with the United States. If the constitutional rights
reserved to "persons" are not natural, it is doubtful that fourth
amendment rights reserved to the seemingly more restrictive class of
"the people" are natural. To be consistent, natural rights advocates
must argue that the exceptions are inappropriate. This argument is
laudable,86 but, because the Supreme Court does not recognize the
existence of constitutional rights in all individuals, natural rights the-
ory does not provide an adequate framework for determining when
those rights exist.
B. The Dissent's Compact Theory Does Not Adequately Explain the
Existence of Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court has explained the Constitution as a compact, 87
but has not used the theory to deny rights to aliens. The compact
theory used by the dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez requires that persons
give up some of their rights in order to have the government protect
their remaining rights.88 The framers of the Bill of Rights did not
clarify to whom the phrase "the people" in the fourth amendment
referred, nor has the Supreme Court defined the phrase. However, the
Supreme Court has indicated that undocumented aliens within the
United States have fourth amendment rights.89
According to the dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez, two distinctions
explain how undocumented aliens can be part of the constitutional
compact from which the dissent would exclude Verdugo-Urquidez.
First, undocumented aliens have different types of ties to the country
than did Verdugo-Urquidez. ° Second, the search of Verdugo-
85. Id. at 785.
86. Henkin, supra note 30, at 27-34. Professor Henkin argues that individual rights are
antecedent to the Constitution and, therefore, exceptions to their existence are anomalies that
should be overturned. He concludes that the Constitution requires the government to respect not
only the rights of the people who are party to the compact, but also the rights of all others within
the jurisdiction of the United States.
87. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793).
88. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1233 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989).
89. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
90. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1237 (Wallace, J. dissenting).
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Urquidez's homes took place outside the United States.9 ' However,
scrutiny shows that neither distinction is persuasive.
1. Undocumented Aliens and Criminal Defendants Do Not Have
Substantially Different Ties to the Country
The Supreme Court has never fully identified which rights vest in an
alien immediately upon entry and which require more ties with the
country. However, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-
Mendoza92 indicates that the ties undocumented aliens have with the
country suffice to extend fourth amendment rights to them.93
Verdugo-Urquidez's ties to the United States are similar to those of
many undocumented aliens. The only significant difference is that
Verdugo-Urquidez entered the country involuntarily, while undocu-
mented aliens enter voluntarily. However, undocumented aliens have
made no compact with our government that Verdugo-Urquidez did
not make. Undocumented aliens have made no express promise to
give up any of their rights. While they may be said to have made an
implied promise to obey our laws, the same implied promise is
required of criminal defendants such as Verdugo-Urquidez. Indeed,
Verdugo-Urquidez is accused of breaking that promise, whereas, by
definition, undocumented aliens have already broken it.
Nor is there a meaningful distinction between the future intentions
of undocumented aliens to establish permanent ties to the country and
Verdugo-Urquidez. Many undocumented aliens are in the country
temporarily, with no intention of becoming citizens or even establish-
ing long-term connections to the United States. However, the Court
has made it clear that even a transitory presence in the country may
cause certain constitutional rights to vest in an alien.9 4
The differences between the ties to our society of Verdugo-Urquidez
and many undocumented aliens do not warrant withholding fourth
amendment rights from the former while extending them to the latter.
If the Constitution is to be viewed as a compact between the govern-
ment and individuals with sufficient ties to the United States, that
91. Id. at 1239-40.
92. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
93. Id. at 1050.
94. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). While the Court in Mathews was referring
to rights associated with amendments reserved to "persons" rather than "the people," the Court
has never chosen to restrict the phrase "'the people" to exclude aliens of any kind. Several federal
courts have interpreted the language to include nonresident aliens who are the subject of
government actions outside the United States. See, e.g.. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d
267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 866 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981).
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compact must also extend to aliens in Verdugo-Urquidez's circum-
stances. At a minimum, the fourth amendment should apply to for-
eign searches of an alien's residences if the alien is physically present
in the country's jurisdiction when the search occurs.
2. Location of the Government Action Should Not Affect the
Existence of Rights of Aliens
A second basis for distinction between undocumented aliens in the
United States and Verdugo-Urquidez is the location of the government
action. The dissent agreed that undocumented aliens within the
United States have constitutional rights against government actions in
this country.95 However, the dissent argued that Verdugo-Urquidez
should be denied fourth amendment rights because the search of his
residences occurred abroad.96
The dissent relied on Curtiss-Wright and Eisentrager to argue that
the government is not restrained by the Constitution when it acts
against aliens abroad.97 However, as the majority correctly points
out,98 Curtiss-Wright involved the breadth of powers that Congress
may delegate to the Executive Branch in foreign affairs, not the consti-
tutional rights of aliens abroad.9 9 Similarly, in Eisentrager, the aliens
involved were enemies of the United States accused of war crimes,100
and the Court indicated that these characteristics were crucial factors
affecting the decision to deny them constitutional rights.101
The indications in Curtiss- Wright and Eisentrager that the Constitu-
tion does not protect aliens against government actions abroad is also
weakened by the Court's subsequent decision in Reid v. Covert.'°2 Of
course, Reid only involved citizens abroad, and Justice Black's state-
ment that the government "can only act in accordance with all the
limitations imposed by the Constitution" begs the question whether
those limitations protect aliens abroad.'0 3 However, Reid is a corner-
stone on which to build the case for aliens' constitutional rights
against extraterritorial government acts. Reid rejected the idea that
95. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1237 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1239-40.
97. Id. at 1240.
98. Id. at 1224 n.3.
99. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
100. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950).
101. Id. at 771. The Court stated: "[C]ourts in peace time have little occasion to inquire
whether litigants before them are alien or citizen. It is war that exposes the relative vulnerability
of the alien's status." Id.
102. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
103. Id. at 5-6.
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constitutional protections stop at the boundaries of the United States.
Moreover, lack of citizenship is not a barrier to granting constitutional
rights to resident aliens."° Therefore, lack of citizenship should not
be a bar to constitutional rights of aliens against government actions
abroad. 105
Finally, a long series of Supreme Court cases discussed above indi-
cates that it is the aliens' ties to the country that is the source of their
rights. 116 Even Johnson v. Eisentrager 0 7 was based on the fact that
the enemy alien defendants were not within the territorial jurisdiction
of United States courts and had no other ties to the country.' °8 The
mere fact that a government action occurs outside the country does
not lessen the substantiality or nature of the ties an alien has estab-
lished with our country, and should not automatically negate an
alien's constitutional rights. °9
C. Broadening the Basis for Aliens' Constitutional Rights: Balancing
Benefits and Costs
The majority's natural rights theory is too expansive to comport
with Supreme Court limits on aliens' constitutional rights."o How-
ever, the extension of fourth amendment rights to Verdugo-Urquidez
can be harmonized with both Supreme Court precedent and the dis-
sent's compact theory by focusing on Verdugo-Urquidez's presence in
the United States when the search occurred."' By itself, however,
presence within the United States is a poor foundation on which to
base fourth amendment rights of nonresident aliens. Such a prerequi-
site would be easily circumvented by overzealous prosecutors and gov-
ernment officials.
104. See supra, notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
105. See Henkin, supra note 30, at 23-24; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 722 & Reporter's
note 16. But see Stephan, Constitutional Limits on the Struggle Against International Terrorism:
Revisiting the Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19 CONN. L. REV. 831, 839 (1987).
106. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
78-79 (1976). The dissent points out that these cases do not involve extraterritorial government
action. However, a number of federal courts have refused to erect a territorial limit to the fourth
amendment. See, e.g., supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
107. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
108. Id. at 771 ("[I]n extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has
been at pains to point out that it was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that
gave the Judiciary power to act.").
109. See United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (implying that the fifth
amendment would have protected alien corporations' property in the Philippines. except for the
fact that destruction of the property by the United States was a necessity of war).
110. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
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For example, the government could have waited until the search of
Verdugo-Urquidez's residences was completed before having him
brought to the United States. Because some Supreme Court dicta
indicate that aliens must enter the country before constitutional pro-
tections vest in them, 1 1 2 such a search might have been legal. 113 If so,
basing aliens' fourth amendment rights solely upon their presence in
the United States provides them with little actual protection against
searches abroad.
To avoid the problem of extending empty rights, the examination of
the relationship between aliens and the government should be broad-
ened. An alien's "ascending scale of rights" referred to in Eisen-
trager114  should not require a formalistic minimum tie of being
present in United States territory. Instead of focusing only on the ties
the alien has established with the United States, the ties established by
extraterritorial government actions against the alien should also be
examined.' 15 Constitutional rights should then be extended if the ben-
efits of doing so exceed the costs." 6 Extending fourth amendment
112. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); see also supra
notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
113. The exclusionary rule can be used by a criminal defendant to exclude evidence seized in
a search that violates the fourth amendment. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-98
(1914). However, no subsequent violation of the fourth amendment occurs upon the
introduction of evidence at trial. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). See
generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
1.1 (2d ed. 1987).
114. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
115. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931). In that case, a
Russian corporation was not "within the United States," and, thus was legally a nonresident
alien. The Court held that the fifth amendment's protections applied to the government's taking
of the corporation's United States property. Id. at 489; see also United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344
U.S. 149 (1952).
Russian Volunteer Fleet can be interpreted as an example of the Court extending constitutional
rights to a nonresident alien because of the relative gravity of the government action involved.
The implication in Caltex that, except for war necessities, the fifth amendment would have
protected alien corporations' property in the Philippines further supports this view. This can be
contrasted with the view that aliens seeking admission to the country do not have constitutional
rights regarding their stay in the United States until they enter the country. See supra notes
26-29 and accompanying text. Aliens seeking admission to the country are seeking a privilege,
not a right. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). The Court has emphasized the
limited scope of judicial review in the area of immigration. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
792-95 (1977). However, in other areas of law, such as takings of property or search and seizure,
courts should feel freer to extend more substantive and procedural rights to aliens. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 42, § 5-16, at 360.
116. This approach is not inconsistent with viewing the Constitution as a compact. If
extending the elements of a compact to nonparties results in benefits flowing to the parties of the
compact that exceed the costs of doing so, it behooves the parties to extend those elements.
It is because the dissent viewed compact theory as an inflexible contract requiring
consideration that it prohibited the extension of constitutional rights to aliens based on
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rights to aliens who are the subjects of extraterritorial government
searches, at least if connected with criminal investigations, is one
instance when those benefits exceed the costs.
1. The Benefits of One Standard of Criminal Justice
Without fourth amendment rights, alien defendants cannot use the
exclusionary rule to exclude evidence at a criminal trial. 117 Withhold-
ing the use of the exclusionary rule from aliens, and granting it to
citizens, sets up an unacceptable double standard of justice in our
courts.
In his dissenting opinion in Eisentrager, Justice Black stated "citi-
zenship is enriched beyond price by our goal of equal justice under
law-equal justice not for citizens alone, but for all persons coming
within the ambit of our power."" ' 8 From this, the converse follows
logically: The value of citizenship is lessened greatly when persons are
arbitrarily subjected to different standards of justice. This is especially
so in criminal matters, where an individual's life and liberty may be at
stake. One standard of justice enhances the strength of our judicial
system and enhances our status in the world community.
When the Bill of Rights was written, it is doubtful that the framers
of that document foresaw the role the country would play in the inter-
national arena. Some Supreme Court dicta, especially in older cases,
indicate a reluctance to extend extraterritorial protections to aliens." 9
However, the Court has also explained that the nature of constitu-
tional rights changes with time.' With increased United States inter-
vention in the international arena comes the responsibility to treat the
people of foreign lands fairly. The benefit of doing so, and the cost of
failing to do so, has increased with our level of international influence.
Whenever possible, the United States must avoid setting one standard
of restraint for our government when it interferes with individual
rights of citizens, and a lesser standard for interference with the rights
of individuals who are not citizens.
formalistic distinctions. See J. STORY, supra note 63, § 340, at 309 (arguing that the
Constitution, especially as it applies to rights, does not rest solely on the basis of contract). Even
using the dissent's approach, criminal accusation, incarceration, and trial should be more than
enough consideration for fourth amendment rights.
117. See supra note 113.
118. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950).
119. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 51 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (especially
in constitutional controversies, rules must yield to the impact of unforseen facts): Wolf v.
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In addition to the benefits for our country's judicial system and
international status, requiring our government to apply the same pro-
cedures in a foreign search as it does with a domestic search also helps
deter the arbitrary invasion of aliens' lives.121 Withholding fourth
amendment rights from nonresident aliens gives the government carte
blanche to search foreign residences, no matter how intrusive the
search or how attenuated the circumstances. 22 The government
would be free to search how, where, and when it pleases, as long as it
does not run afoul of foreign government requirements-requirements
that are often less protective of individuals than those we demand of
our government.
The dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez suggests that, because a warrant
from a United States official is a "dead letter" in a foreign country, the
benefits of requiring the government to obtain one before searching
abroad do not justify the costs. 123 However, this argument overlooks
the fact that the search is connected with a trial that takes place in the
United States. The deterrent effect of the warrant requirement does
not flow from the warrant's validity in a foreign country. Rather, the
effect stems from having to demonstrate probable cause to an official
of the judicial system that will ultimately use the evidence. 124  The
deterrent effect is identical to the deterrent effect the warrant require-
ment has on domestic searches.
The rule "when in Rome, do as the Romans do" makes sense for
tourists, but is bad policy for criminal procedure. The United States
121. The Supreme Court has stated that the point of the fourth amendment's requirement
that a warrant be issued by a neutral judge or magistrate is to deter law enforcement officers from
arbitrarily intruding on an individual's right to privacy in their zeal to ferret out crime. See
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1973).
122. The dissent implied that government searches of aliens and their premises abroad maybe
sufficiently checked by a requirement that government searches of aliens and their premises
abroad not "shock the conscience." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1243-45
(9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989). However, this
standard only requires that torture and brutality be avoided. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1951). This standard does little to deter intrusive searches and seizures. See Note,
Evidence Seized in Foreign Searches: When Does the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
Apply?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161, 167-69 (1983).
123. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1248-49.
124. The fourth amendment protects only against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Generally, a search is reasonable if made in connection with a warrant that meets the
requirements stated in the amendment itself. See supra note 4. However, warrantless searches
may be reasonable, and thus comply with the fourth amendment, in exceptional cases. These
exceptions include hot pursuit and emergency circumstances. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 113,
at § 4.1; L. HENKIN, supra note 42, at 255 & n.19 (1972). The district court from which the
government appealed this case ruled that, even if a warrant was not required to search Verdugo-
Urquidez's residences, the search was still unreasonable. 856 F.2d at 1217. See also supra note
12.
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prides itself as the standard bearer for the world against government
encroachment on individuals' lives. By extending the fourth amend-
ment to aliens abroad, the benefits of equal justice accrue to the United
States, and the costs of arbitrary intrusion into individuals' lives are
avoided.
2. Costs of Extraterritorial Extension of the Fourth Amendment
Recognizing fourth amendment rights in aliens against government
searches abroad is not without costs. However, the increased costs do
not outweigh the benefits that accrue from applying one standard of
justice to all individuals whom we accuse of crimes against our coun-
try. It has been argued that the cost of recognizing extraterritorial
rights in aliens is unacceptably high."2 5 The cost would include a
weakening of our ability to impede drug trafficking, combat terrorism,
and protect our own citizens overseas from foreign governments.126
These are all vital concerns. However, none of them justifies the
greater cost of applying an unequal standard of criminal justice in this
country. '27
Drugs are smuggled by United States citizens as well as noncitizens.
Terrorism is simply individuals committing crimes against the govern-
ment. The same pitfalls of false accusation and erroneous conviction
exist, whether the crimes are committed inside or outside the country,
and whether the individual is a citizen or an alien. Once we justify
"irregular" government conduct against aliens, 28 it is a short slide
down the slippery slope to citizens.
Lack of reciprocity is another basis for arguing that the costs of
extraterritorial rights for aliens are too high.'2 9 It is argued that
imposing restrictions unilaterally upon our government will deny it a
"bargaining chip" for encouraging better treatment of our citizens by
other governments. 3 ' While international human rights agreements
should be encouraged, they should not prevent our courts from apply-
ing standards that exceed such agreements. The moral high ground of
one standard of criminal justice for all accused may not be cost-free,
but abandoning it for an ad hoc, "tit for tat" criminal justice system in
125. Stephan, supra note 63, at 784-85.
126. Id.
127. See generally Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987) (arguing that a desire to curtail drug trafficking and use
does not justify wholesale destruction of civil liberties).
128. Stephan, supra note 63, at 784.
129. Id. at 784-85.
130. Id. at 785.
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a world of unstable governments carries a heavy price. Using aliens'
rights as "bargaining chips" by subjecting them to an arbitrary stan-
dard of criminal justice-and basing that standard on how the aliens'
government treat our citizens abroad, a practice over which the aliens
have no control-is repugnant to any system that respects human
rights and fairness and should be flatly rejected.131
The costs of extending fourth amendment rights to aliens abroad
will be held in check by the same rules that hold down the costs of
administering the fourth amendment in the United States. The same
exceptions to the warrant requirement and exclusionary rule that are
available to the government when it acts within the United States
would be at its disposal when it acts abroad.'32 Courts can find that
exigent circumstances surrounding certain foreign searches justify the
searches, even absent a warrant. 133 Further, the fourth amendment
would only apply if the United States is sufficiently involved in the
action to trigger its protections.13 4
There may be instances when the costs of extending the fourth
amendment's protections to aliens abroad outweigh the benefits of
doing so. Situations involving nonresident aliens that are allied with
enemy governments during war may be one such instance.135 Extra-
territorial searches that are not connected with a criminal investiga-
tion may be another. 136 However, criminal accusation and conviction
13 1. Of course, there are instances besides criminal prosecution when reciprocity may be an
appropriate tool. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 2502 (1982) (reciprocity statute regarding an alien's
privilege to sue in United States courts). The Court has indicated that a circumstance involving
constitutional rights is not one of those instances. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States,
282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931).
132. See supra note 123.
133. See United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane). In holding that
a warrantless search of a foreign vessel on the high seas by the Coast Guard with reasonable
suspicion was "reasonable" under the fourth amendment, the court noted that it could consider
the substantial differences between seizures and searches on land and those on the high seas. Id.
at 1074 & n.10. Similarly, it is foreseeable that the factors determining the "reasonableness" of a
search may differ between searches on foreign soil and those within the United States.
134. A subsequent section of the erdugo-Urquidez opinion discussed this issue. The Ninth
Circuit requires that the United States be sufficiently involved in the action to make it at least a
"joint venture" between the United States government and the foreign government. See United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
1741 (1989).
135. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
136. See Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (nonresident
alien did not have standing to challenge alleged extraterritorial government fourth amendment
violations). Rumsfeld involved government electronic surveillance of an Austrian national in
Germany and was not connected with a criminal investigation. The court distinguished between
cases in which an alien is prosecuted for a criminal violation and situations in which the alien is a
plaintiff in a civil suit against the government for alleged fourth amendment violations. Id. at
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threaten the life and liberty of individuals. There is a large societal
cost associated with arbitrary criminal justice standards. Therefore,
we should bear the costs of extending the fourth amendment abroad to
nonenemy aliens who are the subject of criminal investigations.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made it clear that constitutional rights are
not naturally possessed by aliens. The Court has required "sufficient"
ties between aliens and the United States before such rights have been
extended to them. Historically, the necessary ties have been found if
the alien is physically present, or the government action occurred, in
the territory of the United States.
Requiring territorial ties in an era when our government is increas-
ing the use of its police powers abroad results in arbitrary intrusions
into aliens' lives by our government, and a double standard of justice
at home. Instead, an examination of all ties between aliens and the
United States should determine what constitutional rights they pos-
sess. At a minimum, the Bill of Rights should restrict the government




152-53. In the latter instance, the court decided that aliens lack sufficient ties with the United
States legal system to challenge alleged fourth amendment violations. Id. at 153.
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